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Abstract: The gathering of data about oneself (such as
running speed, pulse, breathing rate, food consumption,
etc.) is rapidly becoming more popular, and has lead
to the catch phrase “Quantified Self” (QS). While this
trend creates opportunities both for individuals and for
society, it also creates risks, due to the data’s personal
and often sensitive nature. Countering these risks, while
keeping the benefits of QS services, is a task both for the
legal system and for the technical community. However,
it should also take users’ expectations into account. We
therefore analyze the legal situation of QS services based
on European law and the privacy policies of some major
service providers to clarify the practical consequences
for users. We present the result of a study concerning
the users’ views on privacy, revealing a conflict between
the user’s expectations and the providers’ practices. To
help resolve the conflict, we discuss how existing and fu-
ture privacy-enhancing technologies can avoid the risks
associated with QS services.
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1 Introduction
The term Quantified Self (QS) arose first in 2007 within
the context of personal data collection. It was initially
coined by Wolf and Kelly for a meetup of 30 people
interested in “new practices” like life logging and loca-
tion tracking. [37] Today, such meetups are held in 125
cities. [28] According to a study from June 2014, health
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and fitness apps—considered to be QS apps—are used
daily by users. Their usage has increased by 62% within
six months. [12]
Our starting point is the observation of two de-
velopments: The increasing demand for data privacy
(emerging especially after the NSA spying scandal be-
came known), and the ongoing growth of the QS move-
ment in recent years. At first glance, both seem to be
incompatible developments. While data privacy is about
imposing constraints on collection and dissemination of
personally identifiable information, the QS movement
wants to collect and analyze as much personal data as
possible. We show that these goals are in fact compat-
ible, but research is required to bring them together in
a practical manner. We focus on privacy aspects aris-
ing from the use of QS services rather than the sen-
sors themselves or their local (e.g. body area) network
connectivity. The interested reader is referred to pub-
lications by Barcena, Wuesst and Lau [5] and by
Hilts, Parsons and Knockel [18] for a discussion of
these aspects.
2 Quantified Self
QS is about the collection of all kinds of different data
by users about themselves. Imagine a user, Alice, who
stores data about her workouts, weight, health condi-
tion, etc., using her smartphone. Smartphones are com-
monly used for QS purposes, as they provide appropri-
ate sensors and are able to retrieve data from external
devices (e.g., digital scales that transmit users’ weights).
Gathering these data provides multiple opportunities, as
shown next.
2.1 Benefits
We can think of numerous different use cases that are
supported by analyzing the collected data. The follow-
ing overview shows just a few possible use cases belong-
ing to four categories that cover a wide range of benefits.
They are organized according to the users (one or mul-
tiple users) and the data (one- or multi-dimensional)
covered by the respective analysis (see Table 1) and de-
scribed below.
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Users
Individual Multiple
D
at
a One-dimensional Reports (I) Competition (II)
Multi-dimensional Correlation (III) Research (IV)
Table 1. Benefits of quantified self services
I Reports (1-dimensional data, 1 user):
Alice could log her workouts just for fun (e.g., in
order to see how many miles she ran in a year).
Such reports, based on health data, can also be used
to control behavior and to live healthier. When, for
example, Alice notices that she is gaining weight,
she might be motivated to increase her workouts.
II Competition (1-dimensional data, n users):
If Alice starts to compare her workout data with
Bob’s data, she might be able to improve her sports
performance, e.g., by copying him when she recog-
nizes that Bob is more successful.
III Correlation (n-dimensional data, 1 user):
In the big picture, analyzing correlations and depen-
dencies of different data provides even more possi-
bilities. For example, Alice can observe the impact
of her sports performance on her weight. Also, by
correlating a log of her mood she might be able to
see the impact of a healthy life to her mood in the
long run—constituting a new finding about herself.
IV Research (n-dimensional data, n users):
The huge amount of QS data voluntarily collected
and shared by users can also constitute a tremen-
dous source of data for research. A health research
institute interested in finding out about the correla-
tion of sports, weight, mood, etc., could “simply”
consolidate the collected data from thousands of
users and analyze their correlations. Alice may sup-
port this because she also benefits from the research
(e.g., when learning that many users doing regular
uphill runs like herself develop knee problems).
2.2 QS Services: State of the Art
QS services available today already cover the whole
range of these benefits. An overview of services associ-
ated with different categories via tags is given in the QS
community’s Guide to Self-Tracking Tools [30]. As this
overview is expansive, we tried to identify a representa-
tive subset of popular services covering many areas of
a user’s personal life. We could not determine the num-
bers of users for all services, so we selected services from
the guide both by means of numbers of users and by the
“popularity” as provided by the guide in April 2014.
Runtastic is a popular (85 million users at the time
of writing) platform for tracking / competing in sports
performance.1 Withings2, the second-most popular tool
tagged as “gadget”, provides hardware for fitness data
tracking (e.g., weight, pulse). Health condition and suc-
cess of treatments can be tracked and analyzed with
CureTogether3, the most popular tool under “medicine”.
A tool for tracking user’s emotions is MoodPanda4—
the most popular service for each tag “lifelogging”,
“lifestyle”, “location”, “mood”, “social”, and “web app”.
Also popular (50 million users) is Foursquare, a social
network for tracking and sharing location-based infor-
mation.5 To cover tools affecting other areas of a user’s
personal life, we further analyze Goodreads (a social
network for book readers with 50 million users)6, the
expenditures-tracking platform Mint (second-most pop-
ular tool with tag “money”, 20 million users)7, and the
time-tracking service RescueTime8 (second-most popu-
lar tool tagged with “productivity”).
Regarding the benefits listed in Sect. 2.1, each ana-
lyzed service provides a user with reports based on her
individual data. Runtastic, for example, generates ex-
tensive reports that allow the user to analyze both con-
crete sporting activities in detail as well as the develop-
ment of her fitness over time. Except Mint and Rescue-
Time, all services encourage competition between users
by allowing them to compare data. All services employ
correlation of different data of a specific user or give
recommendations based on data collected among differ-
ent users. The only benefit still rarely provided is re-
search, which only CureTogether states as its primary
goal. CureTogether’s popularity, however, confirms that
users are indeed willing to share personal data for re-
search purposes. Some QS apps have provided a glimpse
into potential research benefits—a prominent example
being Jawbone, which published aggregated data on the
effect of an earthquake on their users’ sleep [11].
1 https://www.runtastic.com/; see [33] for number of users. All
referenced webpages have been accessed on May 17, 2016
2 https://www.withings.com/
3 http://www.curetogether.com/
4 http://www.moodpanda.com/
5 https://www.foursquare.com/; see https://foursquare.com/a
bout for number of users
6 https://www.goodreads.com/; see https://www.goodreads.c
om/about/us for number of users
7 https://www.mint.com/; number of users claimed on
https://blog.mint.com/credit/mint-by-the-numbers-which-
user-are-you-040616/
8 https://www.rescuetime.com/
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With the exception of Runtastic, which allows using
a limited subset of its features oﬄine, all investigated
QS services require the transmission of a user’s personal
data to a cloud backend, which provides the user with
access to and analysis of the logged data.
Beyond that, a recent trend shows QS service
providers are not only interested in processing and stor-
ing personal data at some central location. Instead, they
also share data with each other, creating an even more
comprehensive data repository. In 2014, Apple intro-
duced HealthKit [3] in iOS 8 as a centralized storage
of health data obtained through QS services and for
sharing the data throughout different QS health ser-
vices. Shortly afterwards, several QS service providers
(Runtastic, Nike, Withings, and RunKeeper, among oth-
ers) stated interest in using it. [23] Samsung announced
a similar service earlier that year: Samsung Architec-
ture Multimodal Interactions (SAMI), a “data broker”
allowing users to upload their QS data to the cloud. [34]
Google presented a similar service dubbed Google Fit9
at its annual developer conference in 2014. [31]
2.3 Risks
Regardless of concerns about specific tools, we highlight
some general risks of processing personal data in the
cloud, as is done by nearly all available QS services.
The risks a user faces when using QS services cer-
tainly depend on the sensitivity of the collected data—a
term defined more precisely in the context of our user
study presented in Sect. 4, and also reflected in legal
considerations (Sect. 3.1). For non-sensitive data, the
main concern might be loss or manipulation of previ-
ously stored data. Sensitive data, however, additionally
require the user to strongly trust the QS service provider
both to not give away data and to maintain an infra-
structure that is secure (e.g., against hacker attacks).
As shown in Sect. 2.1, QS services are usually not
limited to processing data of specific users in isolation.
Instead, they provide comparisons between and statis-
tics among different users, as well as features to share
data (sub)sets with specific users or the public. Those
features bear the risk of leaking personal data to oth-
ers. This might be for obvious reasons like lack of ac-
cess rights management or mismanagement by the data
owner, or due to targeted attacks that try to extract in-
formation about an individual from published statistics
or other data derived from the QS provider’s data set.
9 https://developers.google.com/fit/
Apart from that, it is questionable to what extent
the assumption of a trustworthy QS provider is real-
istic. First, the provider might be forced to give away
personal data (e.g., to law enforcement agencies). Sec-
ond, it might be tempting to sell such data to third
parties (e.g., for financing a free-of-charge QS service).
Besides advertisers, conceivable clients might also be in-
surance companies or employers interested in health-
related data about specific persons. This may violate
those persons’ personal rights, and also have direct fi-
nancial consequences. An insurance company could de-
cide not to accept a customer based on the collected
data, or could charge an increased premium; an adver-
tiser could use the data to try selling tailored products
to the user—a practice considered useful by some per-
sons, but bothersome by others.
Clearly, these risks are amplified if data are shared
between different providers. Such sharing might happen
not only due to explicit usage of tools like HealthKit,
due to law enforcement, or for financing purposes. QS
service providers could also decide to merge their ser-
vices or be acquired by possibly larger services. Runtas-
tic, for example, has recently been acquired by Adidas,
a large manufacturer of sporting goods that has already
been active in the field of wearables and QS before. [1]
While the mentioned risks are, in practice, broadly
accepted today, there are more subtle risks one can think
of: A QS service provider in control of collected data and
interpretations thereof could try to maliciously manip-
ulate such data (e.g., with the goal of analyzing and/or
influencing a user’s behavior). This is not an unlikely
scenario as is shown by a recently published study in
which the mood of Facebook users was successfully in-
fluenced just by manipulating the choice of entries pre-
sented in their news feeds. [25]
3 Law and Privacy Practices
In order to verify our so far theoretical study, we inves-
tigated the different QS services mentioned in Sect. 2.2.
By examining relevant legal regulations and comparing
them to the privacy policies as well as actual practices
of the providers, we determined a real-world view of the
risks that go hand in hand with the benefits offered.
3.1 Legal Situation: Theory
In member states of the European Union, personal data
are legally protected by Directive 95/46/EC and its na-
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tional transpositions. Its successor, the Regulation (EU)
2016/679 of 27 April 2016, is known as the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and will be ap-
plicable from May 25, 2018. In contrast to a directive,
a regulation is directly enforceable law in the member
states. Contradicting national legislation is overridden.
The GDPR contains some clauses that require or allow
member states to regulate specific aspects, e. g. the min-
imum age of a child for consenting to data processing.
The directive and the GDPR are not only applicable
to European service providers. The national transposi-
tions of the directive apply also if data are processed
using “equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on
the territory of [. . . ]” a member state of the European
Union by a non-European company according to arti-
cle 4, paragraph 1 (c) of the directive. The GDPR goes
further by explicitly stating (in its Article 3) that it ap-
plies to any data processing related to “the offering of
goods or services” within the EU, or to the monitoring
of behavior in the EU—even if the data controller or
processor is not established in the EU.
A core concept of both the directive and the GDPR
is to allow processing of personal data only if certain
conditions are met; otherwise, such data processing is
forbidden regardless of the specific nature or relevance
of the data. The conditions which allow processing of
personal data are quite far-reaching, but when inter-
preting data protection law, it is important to keep the
general principle in mind. Neither the directive nor the
GDPR apply to data processing “by a natural person in
the course of a purely personal or household activity”
(Article 3, paragraph 2 of the directive; Article 2, para-
graph 2 (c) of the GDPR). Thus, tools used only locally
by individuals will not normally be problematic. We
therefore focus on data processing by service providers
in this section, starting with considerations concerning
service provision, and then discussing further usage of
the data. The latter is relevant since many QS services
are provided in the cloud (see Sect. 3.2), giving the ser-
vice provider complete access to the data.
3.1.1 Data Processing for Service Provision
Processing of personal data is allowed (according to ar-
ticle 7 of the directive), among others,
– with the data subject’s unambiguous consent
– if it is necessary for “the performance of a contract
to which the data subject is party”, or
– if it is necessary for “purposes of the legitimate in-
terests pursued by the controller”, unless these in-
terests “are overridden by the interests for funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the data subject”.
The last item appears overly broad, but is partly con-
cretized in national legislations. It is not generally in-
terpreted as a carte blanche for data processing, but re-
quires an actual weighing up of the respective interests.
This means that in most cases, service providers will
need the respective users’ explicit consent for any pro-
cessing that goes beyond what is contractually required.
Alternatively, they can process anonymized data.
The GDPR does not substantially change this as-
sessment despite a change in wording (see article 6, sec-
tion 1, of the GDPR): The unambiguity requirement
has been moved to the definition of “consent” (article 2,
item 11 of the GDPR). In addition to data processing
necessary for “the performance of a contract”, process-
ing “in order to take steps at the request of the data
subject prior to entering into a contract” is now also ex-
plicitly allowed. The “legitimate interests” clause now
specifically mentions the case of a child as data subject,
since children are considered as particularly vulnerable.
The specific nature of QS services may add another
complication. As a basic principle, processing of “data
concerning health”10 is prohibited in the EU member
states. Of the few exceptions defined in the directive
(and, similarly, in the GDPR), only the “explicit con-
sent to the processing of those data” is likely to apply for
QS scenarios. This affects all services that process health
data such as a person’s pulse. The consequence—the
need to ask for the users’ consent—is not problematic
per se. QS services are not intended as secret surveil-
lance, but consciously chosen by their users. Services
can therefore ask for consent when necessary.
There are, however, some potentially problematic
conditions. For instance, there are services whose col-
lected data are not only related to their respective user,
but also to others. From a legal perspective, the rele-
vant issue is whether personal data about others are col-
lected. A scale by Withings, for example, measures—in
addition to the user’s weight—room temperatures and
CO2 concentrations. These data are not specific to the
owner or user of the scale, but as they cannot be at-
tributed to any other individuals, this does not pose a
problem from a data protection perspective. CureTo-
10 These—and some other—data are considered as “special cat-
egories of data”.
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gether collects only information about registered users,
but in case of genetic diseases, this information may
also apply to family members. This issue has been men-
tioned by a few authors (e.g., Kayen [24]); a detailed
analysis of the implications of sharing genomic data is
provided by Humbert et al. [20]. We believe that users
are still allowed to disclose the information—considering
both the fact that information about family members
is not systematically collected, and that the data also
refers to the respective CureTogether member himself.
Foursquare uses other users’ information to provide a
service for a user, but all users are registered on the plat-
form and can thus be asked for their consent11. Mint,
which provides the user with an overview of her finan-
cial transactions, may be more problematic; transaction
partners may be identifiable individuals who do not use
the service themselves. As Mint does not currently tar-
get European users12, the classification according to the
European directive is not a practical issue. However, as-
suming that a service like Mint is useful, finding ways
for the legal and privacy-preserving handling of third-
party information remains an interesting research issue
both from a legal and a technical perspective.
The same reasoning can also be applied to data
that are not collected, but computed by a QS service
(e.g., statistics generated for a user). These data might
still contain (as they depend on) personal data about
persons who have not given their consent. The inves-
tigated services provide only sufficiently aggregated or
anonymized information of people who have not given
their consent, though, so no additional issues arise.
To summarize, there is no general issue preventing
the provision of QS services under European law. This
holds both for the directive and for the GDPR. How-
ever, practical implementations could still violate data
protection rules.
3.1.2 Other Usage of QS Data
As pointed out above, the usefulness of data processed
by QS tools is not limited to the individual user. Firstly,
comparisons to other users—or similar statistics—can
11 Note, however, that users are not prevented from uploading
information about third parties, e.g., photographs showing other
people than registered users.
12 It was chosen for our analysis anyway since it is a popular
service within the QS community’s guide to self-tracking tools
that represents a rather specific area that is not yet covered by
any service also focusing on the European market.
be provided. Such a usage is not normally problematic,
as it is part of the service for the users, and will usually
be covered by the contract about service provision.
Secondly, data can be used for other purposes, that
are not part of the service for its users. To protect the
privacy of “data subjects”, European law requires per-
sonal data to be “collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way
incompatible with those purposes”13. There are several
ways to get around that restriction:
– As the directive only applies to personal data, the
use of anonymized data is not problematic. In line
with the definition of personal data, recital 26 of
the directive (and, similarly worded, recital 26 of
the GDPR) states “the principles of protection shall
not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a
way that the data subject is no longer identifiable”.
Whether or not a method of anonymization is suf-
ficient to prevent identification of a data subject is
not purely a legal issue, but requires a technical as-
sessment as well: Recital 26 of the GDPR explicitly
states that “the available technology at the time
of the processing and technological developments”
must be taken into account when judging whether
information is sufficiently anonymized.
– The processing of data for other purposes than ful-
fillment of the contract (with the QS provider) could
be specified as a purpose beforehand, and the users
could be asked for their consent concerning that pro-
cessing.
– National transpositions of the directive can allow
exceptions for scientific research. Article 6, para-
graph 1b continues: “Further processing of data for
historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not
be considered as incompatible, provided that Mem-
ber States provide appropriate safeguards”. The
German legislator, for example, provides such an
exception. For private bodies, it can be found in
section 28, subsection 2, item 3 of the Federal Data
Protection Act14. Under that regulation, personal
13 Article 6, paragraph 1b of the directive; the principle is also
found, in almost the same wording, in Article 5, section 1b of
the GDPR.
14 1. Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) in the version pro-
mulgated on 14 January 2003 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 66),
last amended by Article 1 of the Act of 14 August 2009. We use a
translation provided by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Con-
sumer Protection in cooperation with juris GmbH at http://w
ww.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bdsg/englisch_bdsg.html
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data can be used for a different purpose “if nec-
essary in the interest of a research institution for
the purpose of scientific research, where the scien-
tific interest in carrying out the research project
significantly outweighs the data subject’s interest
in ruling out the possibility of collection, and the
purpose of the research cannot be achieved in any
other way or would require a disproportionate ef-
fort.” Whether the conditions are met, especially
considering the “scientific interest in carrying out
the research project”, is a question that can be an-
swered only individually, but not in general for all
QS tools.
The GDPR contains a similar exception to the di-
rective, and uses a broad definition of the term
research, including “technological development and
demonstration” (recital 159). Article 89 (1) of the
GDPR regulates the required safeguards “for the
rights and freedoms of the data subject” in a very
broad manner. Technical and organizational mea-
sures are required, with pseudonymization men-
tioned as an example. The article also requires data
to be anonymized if the research purpose can be
fulfilled this way.
– The assessment whether data processing is compat-
ible with the original purpose provides some leeway.
While the directive does not specify how to assess
compatibility, the GDPR does (Article 6 (4)): If the
change of purpose is not based on the data subject’s
consent, or on a law of the EU or its member states,
the data controller must take five criteria into ac-
count for the compatibility assessment. These in-
clude “any link” between the original and the new
purpose, the context of the data collection, the pos-
sible consequences for the data subjects, and the use
of safeguards like encryption or pseudonymization.
It is an open question how wide or narrow the new
rule will be interpreted; however, if it went further
than the research exception, the latter would not
make sense. We therefore assume a narrow inter-
pretation of the compatibility of a changed purpose
with the original one.
As stated above, data processed by QS tools will of-
ten belong to the “special categories” of data defined
in article 1 of the directive. With the subject’s explicit
consent, processing these data is also allowed (article
8, paragraph 2a). The mentioned exception for scien-
tific research in the German law also exists, in a similar
wording, for special categories of personal data (section
28, subsection 6, item 4 of the Federal Data Protection
Act)15. The sensitive nature of the data will, however,
have to be considered when striking a balance between
the scientific research interest and the subject’s right
to informational self-determination. Similar to the di-
rective, the GDPR (Article 9) also allows processing of
such data with the data subject’s consent, and—with
appropriate safeguards—for scientific research. The sen-
sitivity of the data must also be taken into account when
assessing the compatibility of a changed data processing
purpose with the original one.
3.1.3 Legal Situation in the United States
The United States’ approach to data protection is dif-
ferent to the European one: As discussed above, the EU
(and a number of other European countries) regulate the
processing of personal data in a very general manner,
and only allow such processing if there is a legal basis for
it. The United States, in contrast, allow data process-
ing in general, though it can be forbidden under specific
laws. [35] An example for such a sector-specific law is the
privacy rule found in the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which regulates the
processing of health information by “covered entities”
such as medical service providers. Though gathered data
may reveal information about someone’s health, QS ser-
vice providers are not likely to be affected by this rule.
An example for privacy legislation on the state level is
the California Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA),
which requires web sites and mobile apps that collect
“individually identifiable information about an individ-
ual consumer” to post a privacy policy that meets cer-
tain conditions. A complete analysis of the federal and
state laws which may apply to QS services is out of the
scope of this article.
As a side note, Daly [9] provides an overview of
legal aspects of QS tools based on Australian law. The
results differ significantly from our European perspec-
tive, and the author concludes that an adaptation of
Australian data privacy legislation might be necessary.
15 Section 28, subsection 6, item 4 does not explicitly mention
that the research must be in the interest of a research institution
(as subsection 2, cited above, does). However, Gola and Schome-
rus ([15], comment on section 28 of the Federal Data Protection
Act, recital 74) point out that independent research is required
in both cases.
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3.2 Legal Situation: Practice
After having worked out some theoretical legal as-
pects for QS tools in general, we were interested in
how user privacy is treated in practice by today’s
popular QS services. For this we examined the pri-
vacy policies, the terms of use, and some practices of
the 8 service providers mentioned in Section 2.2. The
terms of service and policies we examined are avail-
able at https://hyperion.cispa.saarland/quantified-self
/policies.tar.xz. The results are summarized in Table 2
and explained below.
The structure of our analysis is based on categories
of data protection law, most importantly the European
Directive 95/46/EC. The first question is whether data
protection law is applicable at all. Obviously, this is only
the case for data actually processed by the respective
service provider; local data processing under the end
users’ control is not covered. We analyze which providers
process data themselves in Sect. 3.2.1.
Data protection law only applies to personal data,
defined by the directive (article 2 (c)) as “any infor-
mation relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person”. Therefore, the next aspect listed in Table 2,
and discussed in Section 3.2.2 is the information that is
available to the service provider and has the potential
to identify a person.
Article 10 of the directive16 provides the structure
for the following investigated aspects. When collect-
ing information from the “data subject”, the service
provider (“data controller”) must provide the following
information (as far as “[. . . ] necessary, having regard
to the specific circumstances in which the data are col-
lected, to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data
subject”):
– “the identity of the controller and of his represen-
tative, if any” (this information is provided by all
analyzed services and therefore left out in Table 2)
– “the purposes of the processing for which the data
are intended” (discussed in Section 3.2.3)
– “the recipients or categories of recipients of the
data” (i.e., the question to which parties data are
transferred, which is discussed in Section 3.2.4)
– “whether replies to the questions are obligatory or
voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of
16 The list is modified and extended in the GDPR, but as it is
not yet applicable, service providers cannot be expected to take
the modified information duties into account.
failure to reply” (most of the data is not collected
by asking questions, and the few questions (like for
the e-mail address) are clearly marked as mandatory
or optional by all service providers)
– “the existence of the right of access to and the right
to rectify the data concerning him”
Afterwards, we discuss additional aspects noticed dur-
ing our analysis of the privacy policies, which do not fit
into this structure (Sect. 3.2.5). The table also lists the
place of business of the respective service provider, as
this influences both the applicable law and the chances
to enforce that law.
3.2.1 Data Processing by the Service Provider
We noticed that in general, service providers leave users
no choice whether to save the data on their servers or
on their own devices. Thus, the users have no control
about how exactly the data are processed. Users have
to trust the provider to ensure the security of the data.
The only exception to this is Runtastic as it allows users
to choose which data to upload and which to keep saved
only locally. Obviously, data protection law is still ap-
plicable for any data the provider processes (like e-mail
address etc.).
3.2.2 Personal Data
Provision of an e-mail address is mandatory for the reg-
istration to each service (and, in many cases, already
sufficient to identify a person). Due to its unambigu-
ity among the users, it is also an obvious choice as
a user’s identifier for the login procedure. All service
providers employ a regular login via email address and
password, some also offer the possibility to log in via
third party authentication providers such as Amazon,
Google or Facebook. While this makes it easy for users,
it also means that more data about the user are dis-
closed: The service provider may obtain information
stored at the authentication provider17 and the authen-
17 The service providers can specify what information to re-
quest from the third-party authentication provider and the users
can review and decide on this request. In practice this ranges
from only public information (e.g., the user’s public Facebook
profile), to a combination of email address, birthday and list of
friends.
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Runtastic 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Austria 3
Withings 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 France 3 3
Foursquare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 USA (NY) 3 3 3
Goodreads 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 USA (CA) 37
Mint 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 USA (CA) 3 37
RescueTime 3 3 3 3 3 3 USA (WA) 3 3
CureTogether 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 USA (CA) 3 3
MoodPanda 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 UK 3 3
Table 2. Comparison of QS Tools’ Privacy Policies and practical handling of data (as of June, 2015).
1 or parts thereof
2 e.g., birthday
3 includes purely technical improvements and bug fixes
4 whether any information is publicly available with the default settings
5 e.g., a shop where the user checked in
6 3rd parties not further specified in the policy
7 provider explicitly limits information that users can access/rectify
tication provider may learn about the registration with
the service provider.
Despite the fact that none of the analyzed services
need users’ real names and addresses to perform the
advertised tasks, 5 providers request a real first and/or
last name, and Mint even requests information about
the place of residence upon registration. This is critical
as no provider visibly states how this information is used
or why it is needed. The MoodPanda website states that
the name is displayed next to the user’s comments, but
it does not explain why a pseudonym does not suffice for
that. The address required for Mint is later used to sug-
gest businesses in the area for which bills and periodic
money transfers can be set up, but this is not stated any-
where in the policy or during the registration process.
Practical implementations differ from the privacy poli-
cies, though—in our experience, no provider formally
verifies the names given during registration. The ques-
tion whether European law allows the provider to en-
force a real-name policy is yet to be decided by court.
3.2.3 Purpose of Data Collection
Regarding the purpose of the data collection (which cor-
responds to the intended usage of the collected data),
we investigated how the users’ data are processed in ad-
dition to the regular operation of the service. In the case
of Runtastic, for example, it is obvious that the tracks
and timings of a user are used to measure her fitness
and to compare her performance with other people’s. In
their privacy policies, though, all providers require their
users to grant them additional rights.
Notifications are a common purpose for the usage of
contact information, and it makes sense to notify users
directly about changes in the service’s operation. How-
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ever, most services do not specify the nature of the no-
tifications and while 3 providers explicitly state that
they will send advertisements to the users, all policies
but RescueTime’s would allow this (“notifications about
new products and services”).
A very interesting aspect about the notifications is
that only 3 of the 8 analyzed providers state that they
will notify users about changes in their privacy policy
by email. The others merely state that they will notify
about them on the website without specifying the na-
ture of this notification. This might be problematic for
users if the notification is not prominent enough. Some
providers even go as far as giving no notification at all
and relying on the users to periodically check the pri-
vacy policy on the website, as changes are effective im-
mediately after publication. This practice is concerning,
as it theoretically allows a provider to grant itself the
rights to sell user data to any other company and then
do so immediately before any user has had the time to
terminate her account. In the member states of the EU,
such a unilateral change cannot justify any data pro-
cessing, including data transfers, that would require the
data subject’s consent: The directive (article 2 (h)) de-
fines that consent as “freely given specific and informed
indication of his wishes by which the data subject signi-
fies his agreement to personal data relating to him being
processed”.
As pointed out above, data processing by QS ser-
vice providers will usually require the users’ consent, so
unilateral changes of the privacy policies will usually be
illegal in the EU; the practice of not notifying users, or
at least not clearly stating how users will be notified, is
concerning.
3.2.4 Transfer of User Data
We also looked at the rights to transfer user data to
other parties. 4 providers make parts of users’ data pub-
licly available by default. Any user of the service (or, in
some cases, any website visitor) can see some informa-
tion about registered users. This means that it is pos-
sible for adversaries to automatically collect data from
the website without the user’s knowledge. While con-
tact details like the email or real address are not pub-
licly visible by default, pseudonyms or real names allow
any viewer to map details to individuals. From a legal
perspective, this means that user information is passed
to uninvolved third parties, though almost all services
allowing this transfer state that such information is only
shared in an anonymous, aggregated manner. However,
all services allow users to customize their privacy set-
tings and have access only to data explicitly entered by
users, implicitly specifying the amount of information
that can be shared.
For 5 of the 8 services, the user has to grant the
provider the right to transfer arbitrary data to partners
if these partners perform specific tasks (“Data Trans-
fer To Service Providers”). To protect the data from
misuse, 4 of them restrict these partners’ rights (“Ser-
vice Providers Bound by Policy”), so the data may only
be used for the provided services. While the usage of
Google’s Analytics software and the inclusion of social
media buttons (such as the Facebook Like) can be seen
as a sharing of individual information with uninvolved
third parties, this can also fall under the transfer of data
to service providers. Interestingly, only 3 providers state
this in their policy while 7 include Google Analytics on
their websites. Only 2 providers use a feature of Google
Analytics which anonymizes visitors’ IP addresses to a
certain degree (i.e., the last byte of an IPv4 address is
stripped). In this regard, only Runtastic complies with
their own policy to pass only anonymized or aggregated
data to third parties (here: Google) not bound by any
policy.
3.2.5 Other Noteworthy Aspects
Finally, we looked for distinct and noteworthy aspects
in the terms of service and privacy policies that have not
been covered by the categories above. Of the 8 providers
we investigated, Runtastic’s policy included an interest-
ing paragraph. In addition to the usual rights (to use
the data in order to provide the service), the user grants
Runtastic the right not only to collect and store, but also
to modify the user’s data. No statement is made whether
this applies to collected service-related data (e.g., trav-
eled distances and times) or identity-related data (e.g.,
email address or name). Furthermore, according to the
policy, the rights to collect, use, store and modify in-
formation are irrevocable. This means that in theory,
the provider can arbitrarily use and change informa-
tion about current and previous users in any way and is
not bound to give accurate or correct information. We
contacted Runtastic about this and inquired how this
paragraph is applied in practice, but did not receive
any comment within half a year.
Another precarious practice concerns the user’s
legally guaranteed right to access and amend the in-
formation stored about him. Only 5 out of 8 providers
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mention this in their policies and 2 of these 5 limit the
information that users can access and/or rectify.
In conclusion, we found that while many aspects of
privacy policies and the actual usage of data are similar
to what can be expected of a free, ad-sponsored service,
each of the analyzed services’ policies showed concern-
ing or even dangerous practices. These practices (i.e.
allowing modifications to the policy without notifying
the users, or passing personal data to uninvolved third
parties) have the potential to cause harm to oblivious
users. It remains to be seen how widely these are used
throughout the variety of QS services and how badly
they threaten the privacy of the users.
The results are in line with previous research
(not specifically related to QS services). Jensen and
Potts [21] published a survey of privacy policies in
2004. They investigated the privacy policies of 64 popu-
lar websites and found similar problems to the ones iden-
tified in the paper at hand. They especially criticized
readability and the notification practices—providers ex-
pect users to re-read the policies periodically. We still
observe the latter a decade later. Borghi et al. [6] per-
formed a similar study in the UK in 2013, once again
leading to very similar results. Specifically for QS ser-
vices, the study by Hilts, Parsons and Knockel [18]
contains an analysis of privacy policies, complementing
the one at hand regarding the investigated services and
the aspects under investigation. In addition, the authors
tested the responses of nine QS service providers when
a user of the respective service requested information
about his stored personal data. While Canadian law re-
quires them to provide the requested information within
thirty days, only five companies answered in a meaning-
ful manner.
4 User Study
Given the fact that Runtastic alone has 85 million users
as of May 2016 [33] and the numbers for the other ser-
vices range in similar orders of magnitude18, the afore-
mentioned problems seem to be no concern for most of
the target audience. To gain a better understanding of
the users’ preferences and practices, we performed a sur-
vey19 among persons residing in the United Kingdom,
18 https://foursquare.com/about; https://www.goodreads
.com/about/us; https://blog.mint.com/credit/mint-by-the-
numbers-which-user-are-you-040616/
19 The complete questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.2.
with different educational backgrounds (see Tab. 3), of
different ages (see Tab. 4) and different genders (215
female, 172 male, 6 unspecified). Interestingly, the ma-
jority of QS users is under the age of 30, whereas the
majority of the non-users is older than 30.
Education Users Non-Users
Agriculture 0.9% 0.4%
Art 3.4% 6.2%
Business 5.2% 9.5%
Computer Science 12.1% 14.4%
Education and Training 10.3% 9.1%
Engineering 7.8% 4.9%
Health 8.6% 7.0%
Humanities 10.3% 15.2%
Law 4.3% 3.7%
Services 0.0% 3.7%
Social Science 16.4% 12.3%
Other 20.7% 13.6%
Table 3. Education of survey participants
Age Users Non-Users Age Users Non-Users
15-19 9.9% 11.0% 35-39 13.2% 8.1%
20-24 23.1% 15.8% 40-44 6.6% 7.0%
25-29 28.9% 19.9% 45-49 2.5% 11.4%
30-34 14.9% 14.3% ≥ 50 0.8% 12.5%
Table 4. Age distribution of survey participants
We conducted our study with the online survey ser-
vice Prolific Academic20 in February 2016. The service
allows anyone to register as a survey participant who
provides some basic demographic data; researchers can
reject obvious bogus answers, and are required to pay a
reward (in our case, 0.85 GBP) to the remaining partici-
pants. Our survey was open to the first 400 persons who
gave the UK as their country of residence, and whose
answers in previous studies had an approval rate of more
than 85%. After removing incomplete and duplicate an-
swers, 393 participants remained.
4.1 Reasons for QS Usage
While serving as a potential explanation of the users’
behavior, hardly any data are available about why users
use QS services. Therefore, we were interested in their
20 http://prolific.ac/
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reasons for QS usage. We asked QS users and people
who do not (yet) use QS services.21 The results are given
in Fig. 1.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
fun
my friends use it
to change my behavior
to become more efficient
to control my behavior
to live healthier
to improve my performance
to compare with my friends' performance
to get new findings about myself
to get financial benefits in return for my data
QS users QS non-users
Fig. 1. Reasons for QS services usage
People could answer with multiple reasons to those
two questions. We received reasons from 119 QS users
and 274 QS nonusers. The results shown in the figure
were normalized in the number of respondents to allow
for comparison.
Some reasons of QS users differ from those of
nonusers. For example, users answered more often that
they use QS for fun and that their friends use it than
nonusers. On the other hand, nonusers answered more
often that they could imagine to become more efficient,
to live healthier and to get new findings about them-
selves. Interestingly, there is especially one huge differ-
ence between nonusers and users: the nonusers answered
far more often that the reason for using QS would be
financial benefits that they get in return for their data.
The majority of QS users use sports services. A lot of
the users use QS to keep track of their hobbies (espe-
cially reading), their location and their financial assets.
The reasons also reflect the benefits of QS discussed
in Sect. 2.1 and the state-of-the-art of QS discussed in
Sect. 2.2.
We were also interested in users’ opinions concern-
ing risks of QS. For users to perceive risks as being
privacy-related, they must perceive the used personal
data as sensitive in the first place. Therefore, we asked
them to classify data categories according to their sen-
sitivity.
21 The questions were derived from the theory of planned be-
havior [2, 8]; in case of non-users, we asked for reasons they
could imagine to start using a QS service.
4.2 Users’ View on Privacy
Concerning the users’ perception of privacy in QS ser-
vices, we found out that data concerning health are sen-
sitive, which is in line with processing of health data be-
ing prohibited by law as described in Section 3.1. Data
concerning location and finance, however, are even more
sensitive, which is not considered by legal regulations.
The results are given in detail in Fig. 222.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
ﬁnancial assets and ﬁnancial transac�ons
loca�on data
health problems, taken medica�on,…
personal life goals
mood
weight, adipose, muscle mass, heart…
sleeping �me, sleeping disrup�ons,…
working hours, number of working…
daily experiences
meals/drinks (e.g. type), number of…
hobbies
covered distance and al�tude, steps,…
1 very sensi�ve 2 3 4 5 very insensi�ve no answer
Fig. 2. How sensitive are the following data for you?
To find out the differences concerning the perceived
sensitivity of QS data between users and non-users, we
performed the Mann-Whitney-U-Test23. There is no sig-
nificant difference between users and non-users concern-
ing location (p = 0.217) and financial (p = 0.491) data.
This highlights the high awareness for the sensitivity
of these QS data—among non-users as well as among
users. There is a significant difference between users and
non-users concerning health data (p = 0.010), though.
Although both groups perceive health data as sensitive,
QS users perceive health data as more sensitive than
non-users24. In general, the differences in the perceived
sensitivity between users and non-users are small.
Apart from the general sensitivity classification,
the majority of the respondents is worried25 about the
transfer of health data (75%), location data (76%) and
financial data (88%) under their real identity. Interest-
ingly, respondents are even worried about the transfer of
22 see Appendix A.1 for the non-shortened list of categories
23 We have chosen the Mann-Whitney-U-Test because the data
is not parametric.
24 The mean rank of users is 172.87; for non-users, it is 203.95.
The median is 2 for both.
25 Cumulative frequency of those who answered “very much
worried” and “much worried”, at a scale from “very much wor-
ried” to “not worried at all” (five-step scale).
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their data under a random pseudonym (for health data
51%, for location data 55%, for financial data 64%).
Concerning the transfer of these data under the real
identity and under a random pseudonym, there is no
significant difference between QS users and non-users.26
Furthermore, there is no significant difference concern-
ing the transfer of health, finance and location data be-
tween QS users who use a pseudonym and QS users who
do not use a pseudonym.
While this shows that trust in pseudonyms is lim-
ited, their use is obviously seen as advantageous by at
least some of the users. The obvious question arises
whether users themselves use pseudonyms to protect
their identities. Our survey results show that 39% of QS
users choose a pseudonym for services with a real name
policy, instead of using their real names (12% did not
answer the question; among the non-users, 47% would
use a pseudonym, with 18% not answering)27. Almost
all QS service users who use a pseudonym answered the
question about the reason for doing so—besides 2 who
apparently misunderstood the question and provided
their respective pseudonyms. 2 users mentioned usabil-
ity arguments (like “shorter name is better to use”), 3
provided general reasons like “habit”, and the remaining
40 users stated privacy-related reasons—some of them
being specific (e. g. “to prevent anyone from linking my
different accounts online”), but the majority referring
generally to anonymity, privacy, and identity protection.
A similar result was obtained for the non-users. Inter-
estingly, 12 out of 57 QS users who stated a reason for
not using a pseudonym had never thought of the idea; 6
users considered using a pseudonym as “dishonest”, did
not want to violate the policy, or feared to lose access
to the service.
45% of the respondents are also worried about the
storage of the data by the QS service providers. Even
more respondents are worried about the consolidation
of the data (56%) or the storage of the meta data of the
service usage in addition to QS data (65%).
The results show that respondents are worried
about the use of their data; however, only a minority
among the QS service users have read the privacy pol-
icy, as shown in Fig. 3. While 47% admitted not to have
26 Transfer of data type: health 1.) under pseudonym: p = 0.837
2.) under real identity: p = 0.156; location 1.) p = 0.590, 2.)
p = 0.983; financial 1.) p = 0.672, 2.) p = 0.091.
27 The Chi-Square test confirms that the different results con-
cerning the pseudonym usage between QS users and non-users
can be generalized (p = 0.022)
read the privacy policy, we suspect this is true for a
much larger percentage given the number of participants
who chose not to answer this question. The discrepancy
of users stating to be concerned about privacy but not
actually reading policies has been confirmed in previ-
ous surveys [22]. Interestingly, 59% of the QS non-users
state that they would read the privacy policies before
starting to use a QS service. The different results be-
tween users and non-users concerning the privacy policy
reading behavior can be generalized.28
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
yes
no
no answer
If you use Quantified Self
services, have you read the
privacy policies?
Would you read the privacy
policies before starting to use a
Quantified Self service?
Fig. 3. Portion of QS users reading the services’ privacy policies
The survey also gives hints that QS users are con-
cerned about the security of their data. 74% of the re-
spondents are afraid that their data can be stolen by
hackers.
4.3 Opposing Users’ View Against Reality
It is interesting to see that users’ fears in terms of pri-
vacy protection do not necessarily correlate with how
they act.
An obvious example concerns the use of data. For
example, four of the QS service providers listed in Tab. 2
explicitly state that they use personal data for per-
sonalized advertisement. We asked the respective users
whether they expect these providers to use their data
for that purpose. For each provider, at least half of
the users did not expect such behavior. Most of them
even stated they would not continue using the respective
provider if it used their data for personalized advertise-
ment (see Tab. 5).29 Similar results were obtained for
services which make user data public by default; once
28 Chi-Square test, p < 0.001.
29 In case of Mint, there was a user who both stated he expected
Mint to use his data for personalized advertisement, and that
he would not continue using Mint in that case.
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Service Users Expect personal-
ized advertisement
Would continue
using service
Yes No Yes No
Runtastic 32 10 22 12 20
Foursquare 11 5 6 6 4
Mint 11 5 5 4 6
MoodPanda 4 1 3 1 3
Table 5. Expectations concerning personalized advertisement
Service Users Expect data to be
public
Would continue
using service
Yes No Yes No
Runtastic 32 6 26 7 24
Foursquare 11 2 8 4 7
Goodreads 30 8 22 10 17
MoodPanda 4 1 3 1 3
Table 6. Expectations concerning default visibility settings
again, a majority of users did not expect this behavior
(see Tab. 6).
The apparent contradiction can be explained by a
lack of awareness, which is not surprising: As previously
mentioned and illustrated in Fig. 3, at least 47% of QS
users did not read the privacy policies before starting to
use the service.
As another example, as shown in Tab. 2, 7 out of
8 QS tools exclusively store the gathered data in the
cloud. 14.5% of the survey participants use one of these
7 QS tools; within that group, 37% (compared to 45%
when considering all survey participants) are worried
about their data being stored by the service provider.
Both lack of awareness or a conscious decision to ac-
cept the drawback are possible explanations why these
persons continue to use the respective services.
4.4 Willingness to Pay for Privacy
Only a minority of respondents are willing to pay a one-
off fee for the privacy of their data (i.e. to prevent the
non-anonymized transfer of their data to third parties):
30% for the privacy of their health data, 30% and 39%
for the privacy of location and financial data respec-
tively.30 30% stated that they would pay a fee for a
technical solution that anonymizes their data before up-
loading them to the QS service provider. Surveys and
experiments in literature also indicate a low willingness
to pay for privacy [16]. A laboratory study by Tsai et
al. [36] indicates that prominently displayed privacy
information may have a more significant impact on pur-
chasing behavior. With that information, users tend to
purchase from online retailers that better protect their
privacy. The study even indicates users would be willing
to pay a premium to purchase from privacy protective
websites. The difference to our own study may be ex-
plained by the lack of reliable and accessible privacy
information provided by service providers in real-world
scenarios (as opposed to the laboratory study).
4.5 Limitations of the User Study
Like all empirical research, the survey must be carefully
interpreted, taking into account any potential biases.
One limitation of the study concerns the sample. We
have conducted an online study. Although online stud-
ies are less error-prone in terms of the result analysis,
the sample consists of Internet users only and, thus,
might exclude some groups of the population and en-
danger the representativity of the results. However, this
risk is considered to be negligible today. Most studies in
the technical field are performed online. Furthermore,
as shown in Tab. 3 and Tab. 4, diverse groups concern-
ing age and educational background are represented in
our study. Another issue might be generalizability. This
limitation is due to the number of registered, potential
study participants in the survey system that we used.
If we had opened the survey for participants from dif-
ferent EU countries, we would not have reached the ad-
equate number of participants for each country that is
necessary to achieve representative results—especially
in terms of comparability between different countries.
We opted for reliable results from one country instead
of trying to cover the EU as a whole.
4.6 Other QS User Studies
User studies previously performed by other authors can
provide insights in addition to the results discussed in
30 Even fewer users would pay a monthly fee for the privacy of
their data: 21% for the privacy of health data, 21% and 30% for
the privacy of location and financial data, respectively.
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the paper at hand. Zhang et al. [40] investigate influ-
ence factors of the decision to disclose data collected by
Fitbit, thus contributing to a better understanding of
privacy choices and complementing our user study.
The fact that Quantified Self does not only cover
personal data about oneself but also has implications
for people in the surroundings, is illustrated by Hoyle
et al. [19] for the case of wearable cameras that con-
stitute another approach towards lifelogging. They con-
ducted a user study with 36 participants in order to
find out which kind of images are considered as sensitive
by users: A combination of other people shown on the
picture, time and location is considered as sensitive by
most participants. As the authors also point out, users
would prefer to manage privacy during the process of
lifelogging (i.e., while capturing images), and not after
the collection has been finished.
5 Towards Privacy-Aware
Quantified Self Tools
Our user study has shown that privacy concerns play a
role for many users. Still, not all users act accordingly—
the majority does not even read the privacy policies.
Most users are not willing to pay for better privacy pro-
tection.
As a consequence, providers may not gain much
from charging their customers for improved privacy.
However, the privacy-aware minorities are significant,
and there are also other good reasons to invest in
privacy-enhancing technologies. Legislation in some re-
gions, such as the European Union, may otherwise re-
strict the potential usages of gathered data—in partic-
ular health-related data. In this context, the concept of
“privacy by design and by default” plays a crucial role
in the GDPR. Moreover, customers with a low willing-
ness to pay for privacy may still prefer a service provider
that protects their data. We therefore suggest require-
ments for privacy-aware QS services, and discuss some
potential approaches to fulfill them.
Suitable privacy requirements are highly dependent
on the benefits that should be provided by a specific QS
tool (cf. Sect. 2.1), ranging from basic requirements and
straightforward solutions for simple services to complex
requirements for sophisticated services.
5.1 Reports Based on Individual Data
In the simplest case, if a QS tool aims only at reports
based on data collected about an individual user, pri-
vacy could be respected by employing an oﬄine solu-
tion. Obiously, this assumes that measures against local
attacks—like tracking devices with a static Bluetooth
address [5, 18], or attacking a body area network [26]—
are in place.
If all calculations are performed locally (e.g., by an
app running on the user’s smartphone), it is completely
up to the user to decide whether data are shared with
others or not. Although this is rather simple to achieve,
none of the QS services we analyzed but Runtastic ac-
tually supports this today.
A privacy-respecting solution could, however, also
be easily achieved if storage and/or processing of per-
sonal data were performed within a cloud backend,
e.g., by employing pseudonymization. Pseudonymity
is achieved if data is mapped to a pseudonym, but
not the full (real-world) identity of the user. Achiev-
ing pseudonymity does not usually require technical
changes to the service, as users can simply enter
pseudonyms instead of their real names. Even for fee-
based services, persistent links of real names to accounts
are not necessary. Prevention of multiple registrations
by the same person is harder when using pseudonyms,
but it is disputable whether the collection of real names
provides an adequate countermeasure. Pseudonymity
could, thus, already be achieved with the analyzed QS
services in principle, but it is actually prevented in most
of the service’s terms of use for inexplicable reasons as
pointed out in Section 3.2.2.
Regardless, pseudonymity is a weak requirement.
In multiple cases, pseudonyms could be successfully
mapped to persons using external information [29].
Given the kind of data processed by QS tools, find-
ing such a mapping could be especially simple in our
context. A location history of a pseudonymous user, for
example, is likely to reveal her place of residence, which
significantly lowers the necessary efforts to ascertain her
identity.
A much stronger requirement would be unlinkabil-
ity. Unlinkability of values means that they cannot be
successfully linked with a sufficient probability—most
commonly, we consider the values to be linked if they
refer to the same person. As an example, different ser-
vice providers should not be able to collaborate in order
to link different data sets belonging to the same user.
Possibilities to create such a link are communica-
tion channels (e.g., a user connecting to different service
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providers from the same source IP address) and authen-
tication schemes. Concerning communication, unlinka-
bility of different interactions between users and service
providers is offered by anonymity networks like Tor [10].
Concerning authentication and authorization, anony-
mous credential schemes [7] can be used. Unlinkability
for the data themselves can, in principle, be achieved by
reducing their precision. While the problem has been in-
vestigated for location privacy [17], there is no general,
application-independent solution.
At the extreme, unlinkability means that nobody
shall be able to tell whether any two data points are
linked or not. To this extent, however, the require-
ment is not suitable for the QS scenario: Most ser-
vices rely on processing of time series data, and re-
moval of timing information—as is required to provide
unlinkability—would render the data useless. In some
cases (such as the gathering of location data or pulse),
data from consecutive time periods will also be highly
correlated, allowing to observe links even if explicit tim-
ing information is removed. Assume a system measuring
the users’ pulse in one-minute intervals, and providing
the following data about three users: t0 : {61; 75; 140};
t0+1minute : {145; 85; 57}. Even if any explicit links are
removed and no further information is available, a map-
ping between values from the two time periods could be
found with high probability.
To account for that, suitable definitions of unlink-
ability for the QS scenario still have to be found. The
characteristics and concrete requirements of each indi-
vidual service have to be analyzed with respect to its ac-
ceptable and/or required information leakage, and tai-
lored technical solutions have to be developed that en-
force these requirements.
As long as the data affect only a single user and no
complex computations are required, however, a cloud-
backed QS service with better privacy guarantees could
be realized much more easily. Any computations could
be performed locally by a device in control of the user,
and end-to-end encryption could be used to store results
and other data within the QS service’s cloud backend.
Unfortunately, this is implemented by none of the ser-
vices we analyzed.
5.2 Competition
If competition is to be supported, restricting access to
personal data to their owner is not an option anymore.
Instead, the goal is to provide some information to oth-
ers to allow comparisons, while maintaining some degree
of privacy for the user. More sophisticated approaches
are thus required which account for the specific kinds of
comparisons that are desired for competition between
users. Two dimensions are of special importance here:
The group of users within which comparisons should
be performed, and the granularity of data involved in
comparisons.
If a user wants to compare and share her data with
the general public, the data are obviously not consid-
ered sensitive, so no privacy-preserving measures are
required. Limiting the scope of the comparison to a
couple of users, on the other hand, can be realized by
employing end-to-end encryption and sharing the cor-
responding key(s) among the group of legitimate users.
For larger group sizes and dynamic group memberships,
which we expect for QS services, key management is
likely to become a challenge that could be tackled by
adaptation of schemes from the related field of secure
group communication [38].
An end-to-end encrypted exchange of personal data
between legitimate users (e.g., their weights at different
points of time) is sufficient as long as a fine-grained com-
parison of each individual data point is desired. Com-
petition is also possible, though, if users consider these
data too sensitive for being shared within a respective
group.
If users are, for example, only interested in relations
between their data (e.g., who has the lowest weight,
whose pulse is below a certain threshold, whose pulse
is lower than Alice’s, who slimmed down most within
a certain time range, . . .), there is no need for sharing
exact numbers. Instead, users should be able to reveal
only limited information suitable for a certain compari-
son, and nobody else should be able to learn more than
the information voluntarily disclosed. Protocols solv-
ing Yao’s millionaires’ problem [39] could be candidates
for that purpose, allowing comparisons between values
without revealing them.
Similarly, users could be interested in only finding
out commonalities (e.g., which users are running the
same distance, which users have similar weights, . . .).
Private set intersection protocols [13] could be used to
show results only in the case the respective users have
certain data in common, i.e. without revealing further
information.
Alternatively, or in addition, privacy needs might
also be satisfied by fuzziness or aggregation. For many
comparisons, exact numbers might not be required, but
it might be sufficient to round values or work with
clusters of similar values (e.g., compare only intervals
of weights), or to aggregate data collected within cer-
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tain time spans (e.g., compare users’ monthly average
weights). Such mechanisms are already applied in prac-
tice, but only with respect to data that are shared with
third parties as discussed in Section 3.2.4.
5.3 Correlation
In contrast to the previous benefits, the benefit of cor-
relation involves multi-dimensional data and, thus, re-
quires much more complex processing by the QS ser-
vice. From a privacy perspective, however, this benefit
is easy to deal with as only a single user is involved. Es-
sentially, the same requirements and approaches can be
established as described under reports based on individ-
ual data. If QS services offer a method to export indi-
vidual data in a well-known format, even data collected
by different QS services could be brought together for
local processing in a privacy-preserving manner. If local
processing is not an option for any reason (e.g., due to
limited capacity of the devices used by end users), pro-
cessing of aggregated and/or fuzzy data as described
above could be sufficient to acquire new findings.
Some insight may be gained from research in
context-aware services [4] in this scenario. As pointed
out by Riboni et al. [32], obfuscation techniques for lo-
cation privacy cannot be applied in a straightforward
manner to other context information. Moreover, the au-
thors point out that such additional context information
also makes “identity anonymity” difficult to achieve—a
similar issue to the processing of multi-dimensional data
in a QS scenario. There is, however, a major difference:
Research on context-aware services aims at the (in some
cases: privacy-preserving) use of current context data to
provide a tailored service; QS tools, on the other hand,
are more geared towards provision and analysis of data
over a longer timespan.
5.4 Research
Allowing research is a bigger challenge: Here, both
multi-dimensional data and different users are involved.
If sensitive data of several users possibly not knowing
each other (and thus, possibly not willing to share their
data with each other) should be combined to gain in-
sights, purely local processing is no longer feasible.
The already mentioned approaches, however, can
also be adapted to this case: Depending on the spe-
cific research goal, fuzzy or aggregated data of sin-
gle users might be sufficient, and pseudonymization
might be performed anyway. As before, unlinkabil-
ity only makes sense to a certain degree, as different
data—particularly multi-dimensional data (e.g., pulse
and breathing rate)—need to be linked to be able to
gain research insights.
In addition, aggregation is not only possible with re-
spect to different data of a single user, but also with re-
spect to different users (e.g., what is the average weight
within a certain group of users). This means that even
if exact numbers are required, computations are per-
formed in such a way that the QS service perform-
ing the computation (and possibly other users) may
only learn aggregated information, but nothing about
any individual user’s value. To be useful, such an ag-
gregation must cover a sufficiently large group, and
an attacker must not have prior knowledge about the
group’s members. Privacy-preserving data aggregation
has been tackled for smart meters [27] and wireless sen-
sor networks [14]. Often, the approaches employ ho-
momorphic encryption to perform calculations on en-
crypted data. In QS services, we expect dynamic group
memberships, more frequent measurements, and multi-
dimensional data. Moreover, users may want to reveal
different kinds of aggregates (e.g., their improvement
over time instead of a current fitness level).
6 Conclusion and Outlook
Although quantified self tools are increasingly collect-
ing more personal data of users, storing them within
the cloud and starting to consolidate data from differ-
ent services, the number of users is ever increasing. The
privacy policies of the service providers that we ana-
lyzed allow the usage of data for diverse purposes. In
the survey we conducted, we found out that users say
they care about their private QS data—at least when
it comes to data relating to health and finances—and
that they are afraid of it being shared with third par-
ties. Only a minority of the respondents would pay for
QS services that offer better protection of their personal
data from unwanted transfer, though.
Concerning future work, we are investigating appli-
cations of privacy-enhancing technologies, and are also
analyzing the economic aspects of privacy protection for
QS services.
To conclude, it is noteworthy that only little re-
search has yet been conducted in terms of privacy pro-
tection in this field—even though it deals with sensi-
tive, personal data. It will be interesting to see whether
privacy-preserving QS tools—which do not yet exist—
might be better accepted by users in the future.
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A QS Survey
A.1 Types of Sensitive Data
The complete list of data categories as used, e.g., in
Tab. 2 is as follows:
– weight, adipose, muscle mass, heart frequency, body
mass index
– covered distance and altitude, steps, burnt calories,
etc.
– sleeping time, sleeping disruptions, movements dur-
ing the sleep, sleeping quality, snoring, etc.
– meals/drinks (e.g. type), number of chews, calories
– financial assets and financial transactions
– working hours, number of working disruptions, com-
pleted tasks, etc.
– mood
– daily experiences
– personal life goals
– health problems, taken medication, allergies, labo-
ratory results, etc.
– location data
– hobbies
A.2 Questionnaire
Our survey was performed using the LimeSurvey31 sur-
vey system. Below is a compact version of the full ques-
tionnaire we used. Question groups of the questionnaire
are shown as paragraphs and questions are displayed as
items. Answer options are given after “→”: if separated
by comma, we allowed multiple answers; if separated by
⊕, the user had to decide on a single option. The answer
option “other” was always combined with a freetext an-
swer field.
Foreword
What is Quantified Self?
Quantified Self is a self-monitoring technology that al-
lows to track person’s daily life in terms of inputs (e.g.
food consumed, sleeping hours, covered distance), states
(mood, blood oxygen levels) and performance (physical
and mental).
You are kindly asked to fill in the questionnaire.
Main Part
Before you start...
1. Please enter your Prolific ID
→ freetext
31 https://www.limesurvey.org/
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QS usage in general
2. Do you use Quantified Self services?
→ Yes ⊕ No
Questions for QS users
only asked if answer for question 2 was “yes”
3. Which QS services do you use?
→ services from Tab. 2, other
4. What are your reasons for using QS?
→ reasons from Fig. 1, other
Questions for QS nonusers
only asked if answer for question 2 was “no”
5. What are your reasons for not using QS services?
→ I don’t know any QS services, I am just not in-
terested, I am worried that they use my data for ad-
vertising, I am worried that they forward my data
to uninvolved third parties, other
6. Which reasons could you imagine to start using
Quantified Self Services?
→ reasons from Fig. 1, other
Categories of collected data
7. How sensitive are the following data for you?
→ ∀ options from Fig. 2: 1 = very sensitive ⊕ 2 ⊕
3 ⊕ 4 ⊕ 5 = very insensitive
8. How much are you worried about the transfer of
your data to third parties (e.g. insurance compa-
nies, employers or business companies) if a random
pseudonym (like “user 1234”) is transferred instead
of your real name?
→ ∀ options from Fig. 2: 1 = very much ⊕ 2 ⊕ 3 ⊕
4 ⊕ 5 = not at all
9. How much are you worried about the transfer of
your data to third parties (insurance companies,
employers or business companies) if they are trans-
ferred under your real identity?
→ ∀ options from Fig. 2: 1 = very much ⊕ 2 ⊕ 3 ⊕
4 ⊕ 5 = not at all
Privacy practices
10. How much are you worried that...
– ...your data is stored by the Quantified Self Ser-
vice Providers?
– ...your data is consolidated? (e.g., health data
+ financial data)
– ...meta data of your service usage (e.g., loca-
tion information, IP addresses, time of access)
is stored additionally to your Quantified Self
data?
– ...your data could be stolen by hackers?
→ ∀ subquestions above: 1 = very much ⊕ 2 ⊕ 3 ⊕
4 ⊕ 5 = not at all
11. ∀ service ∈ Tab. 2 ∩ user’s choices in question 3:
Privacy practices of service
– Would you expect your data stored by service
to be public by default?
– Would you continue to use service if your data
were public by default?
– Would you expect service to forward your (non-
anonymized) personal data to uninvolved third
parties?
– Would you continue to use service if it for-
warded your (non-anonymized) personal data to
uninvolved third parties?
– Would you expect your data stored by service
to be used for personalized advertisement?
– Would you continue to use service if it used your
data for personalized advertisement?
→ ∀ subquestions above: Yes ⊕ No
Pseudonyms
12. Do you use pseudonyms even when the Quantified
Self service has a real-name policy?
only asked if answer for question 2 was “yes”
→ Yes ⊕ No
13. Why do you use pseudonyms?
only asked if answer for question 12 was “yes”
→ freetext
14. Why don’t you use pseudonyms?
only asked if answer for question 12 was “no”
→ freetext
15. If you used QS services, would you use pseudonyms
even when the Quantified Self service has a real-
name policy?
only asked if answer for question 2 was “no”
→ Yes ⊕ No
16. Why would you use pseudonyms?
only asked if answer for question 15 was “yes”
→ freetext
17. Why wouldn’t you use pseudonyms?
only asked if answer for question 15 was “no”
→ freetext
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Willingness to pay
18. Would you pay a one-off fee in order to prevent
the (non-anonymized) transfer of the following data
to third parties (insurances, employer and business
companies)?
→ ∀ options from Fig. 2: Yes ⊕ No
19. Would you pay a monthly fee in order to prevent the
(non-anonymized) transfer of the following data to
third parties (insurance companies, employers and
business companies)?
→ ∀ options from Fig. 2: Yes ⊕ No
Opinion
20. Please give your opinion.
– Would you pay a one-off fee in order to pre-
vent the transfer of your data to third parties
(e.g. insurance companies, employers and busi-
ness companies)?
– Would you pay a monthly fee in order to pre-
vent the transfer of your data to third parties
(e.g. insurance companies, employers and busi-
ness companies)?
– Would you agree to the transfer of your data
to third parties (e.g. insurance companies, em-
ployers and business companies) if you got the
Quantified Self service for free?
– If you want to share your Quantified Self data
with others – would you like to choose those
people on your own?
– Do you use the function for indicating the per-
son you want to share your data with?
– Would you agree to transfer your financial data
to third parties for a reduction of insurance
rate?
– Would you agree to transfer your health data to
third parties in order to contribute to prevent
epidemics?
– Would you use a Quantified Self service that
finances itself by transferring your data to third
parties (e.g. business companies)?
– If you use Quantified Self services, have you read
the privacy policies?
– Would you read the privacy policies before
starting to use a Quantified Self service?
– Would you pay a fee for a technical solution that
anonymizes your data before transferring it to
the Quantified Self service provider?
→ ∀ subquestions above: Yes ⊕ No
Closing questions
21. Please indicate your age.
→ options from Tab. 4
22. Please specify your nationality.
→ freetext
23. Please specify your education.
→ options from Tab. 3
24. Please specify your gender.
→ Female ⊕ Male
